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MATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a partial judgment quieting title in Plain-
tiffs' to a one-sixth interest in two mining claims. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was resolved by Summary Judgment on Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A0~ellant seeks a reversal and judgment in his 
favor as a ~atter of law or a new trial. 
The Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant's statement of facts is accurate and 
fairly reported so far as they go. However, there are other 
material facts that Respondents wish to present to the Court. 
Parenthetically, one statement made on page 8 of 
appellant's brief is accurate but possibly disarming, and 
might suggest that the Bamberger interests had not paid 
the taxes on the property, the subject of this 1/6 interest 
for the years 1974 through 1977, which is not the fact. 
The exhibit provoking Appellant's statement was Exhibit #9, 
an abstracter's certificate (R-89). Such certificate, with 
an attached chart, clearly shows that the taxes on the one-
sixth interest were fully paid for each of said years, and 
any implication in Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9, to the effect 
that there may have been a "redemption," rather than "pay-
ment" of taxes would be without support in the record. 
In addition to what is said in Appellant's brief, 
and without unnecessary repetition the following factual 
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background also appears from the record: 
The original source of title ta the mining claims 
involved here, was the U. S. Patent issued ta the defendants 
Clark on July 12, 1909 (R-21 and Ex. P6) that created a 
tenancy in common for lack of language specifying otherwise, 
which, under Sec. 1973 of the 1907 Compiled Laws of Utah 
1907 (now 57-1-5, U.C.A., 1953), created such tenancy. 1 The 
patent included the Virginia, Virginia #1, April and April 
Fraction claims. 
Two years later, on July 31, 1911, the Clarks, by 
"Deed" (R-94) quitclaimed a one-third interest in only two 
of the claims, - the April and Virginia, - to Ernest Bam-
berger and Russell G. Schulder. Bamberger was a long time, 
well-known "mining man," and Schulder a practicing "lawyer." 
The former died in 1958, the latter in 1926, leaving estates. 
Schulder's estate was probated and is still pending, the 
present litigation having to do with the rights of the two 
grantees and their successors in the property deeded to them 
in July, 1911. The Administrator of Schulder's estate was 
W. T. Gunter, who died in 1932. 
The Patent and Deed established three important 
facts: 
1) That the subject property was "mining" prop-
erty, primarily to develop minerals "for the use of the 
occupant" (one of the three purposes necessary for acquiring 
adverse title under Sec. 78-12-9, U.C.A., 1953); 
2) That those instruments created a present and 
continuing possession right in the patentees (Clarks) and 
1. D.&.R.G.R.R. v. S. L. I~v. Co., 35 Utah 528. 
-2-
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their successors, Bamberger, Schulder, et al., that would 
satisfy "possession requirements" necessary to establish 
adverse possession under "Sec. 78-12-7, Adverse 
Possession"; and 
3) Furnished any of such patentees and their 
successors, any necessary "color of title" to establish 
title by adverse possession under Sec. 78-12-7, U.C.A., 
1953 based on a "Written Instrument. 112 
The parties have stipulated that at least since 
1938, the Bamberger interests have paid all taxes on the 
subject mining claims. This alone eliminates any necessity 
further to prove the tax payment requirements found in the 
adverse possession statutes, as well it should dispel any 
confusion mentioned above as to plaintiffs' pleading a cause 
of action based on a written instrument. 
The history and rights of the defendants Clark are 
not actually germane to this, the remaining part of the 
litigation, since this Court already has quieted title in 
the plaintiffs to five-sixths of the interest asserted in 
the April and Virginia claims (R-64 and R-76). The only 
circumstances that may be of some interest here having 
reference to the Clarks, is that the tax "notices," since 
the 1911 ''Deed" to Bamberger and Schulder, have been sent to 
Bamberger's office at 163 Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
which notices sometimes combined the Bamberger-Cl~rk names 
2. Respondents urge and argue, infra, that Appell~nt's 
contention in his Brief (R-172) that Respondents' claim is 
not founded on a written instrument, is without merit and 
must be the result either of failure to read or mis-read-
ing of Respondents' Second Cause of Action (R-304) and other 
parts of the complaint, which see. 
-3-
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and other times were sent separately in the names of Bam-
berger-Clark and sep~rat~l; in the names of Bamberger-
Schulder, which appears to be a procedure of the County 
Treasurer. 
There has been no offer made by Russell G. Schulder, 
grantee and co-tenant in the 1911 deed, nor by W. T. Gunter, 
Administrator of Schulder's estate, nor by Russell Graydon 
Schulder, present Administr~t·i~ nf the estate, nor by anyone 
else since at least 1957 (Ex. P-1), nor by any of the 
Schulders or anyone else shown in the record or by the 
defendant, Russell Graydon Schulder, individually or as 
Administrator, to reimburse Ernest Bamberger or any of his 
successors, for taxes paid, expenses incurred or other 
expense incident to the preservation or operation of the 
claims. 
Nor has any offer of reimbursement been made or 
tendered into court ac any time during the pendency of this 
litigation before the appeal of this case. 
There was but one time when the Bambergers' claim 
to the property was in dispute, and then only by way of 
Summit County's claim for non-payment of the taxes for the 
year 1942. On that occasion Bamberger, through his account-
ant, made objection to the County's claim to the property 
by reason of tax delinquency, who promptly advised the 
County Assessor and Treasurer (R-110) of a double assess-
ment. The County acknowledged the error at a regularly 
called Commission meeting on Nov. 1, 1943, and the minutes 
reflect that the taxes had been paid timely by Ernest Bnm-
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berger. The Commission ordered that the double assessment 
be eliminated "without costs to Ernest Bamberger." (R-118). 
Such error on the part of the County does not even appear in 
the Abstract. 
Contrary to what the Appellant contends and in 
spite of the obvious and extreme difficulty in obtaining 
evidence as to the history of a mining claim operation in 
rather remote areas extending over more than a half century 
span, the record is not devoid of facts showing preservation 
and maintenance of the claims as the Appellant would have 
this Court believe. The record reflects the location of the 
claims, proof of labor and assessment work by the Patent 
itself, together with evidence of some development or opera-
tional work, as reflected in the affidavit of a prominent 
lawyer and early participant in working on mining properties 
in the area, and specifically on Bamberger claims, who, as a 
young man, with his father, performed work on "claims owned 
by the Bamberger family," and that he is generally familiar 
with the claims owned by that family. (Ex. P.3). 
Other prominent people having knowledge of the 
area, were acquainted with the Bamberger interests and dealt 
with them on an across the board basis, with the assumption 
that Bambergers were the sole and only owners of the claims, 
even to an extent of agreeing orally and in writing to 
settle boundaries between their contiguous claims and those 
of the Bambergers, as sole owners of their respective claims 
with no reference to the Clarks, Schulders or anyone else 
(Osika Dep. R-120; 138, 139; Communication, R-141; Affi-
-5-
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davit, R-143; Affidavit, R-145). 
The claims involved here were not listed in the 
Inventory of Russell G. Schulder's estate, by the latter's 
Administrator, W. T. Gunter, who, like Schulder, was a 
practicing lawyer; and there is nothing in the record to 
indicate by pleading or affidavit, that Schulder ever men-
tioned the claims or offered reimbursement, for taxes and 
expenses, nor was an accounting ever shown to have been 
requested by him or anyone else. The record does show, 
however, that five separate claims of interest in mining or 
other real property in several different counties (R-103) 
were listed, with no listing of the April and Virginia 
claims, the subject of this litigation. 
The record clearly shows that there is nothing in 
the pleadings that specifically refutes or explains such 
failure to list or claim an interest in the claims, nor has 
a claim or supplementary inventory and appraisement re-
quested or filed in Russell G. Schulder's estate. Nor is 
there any affidavit, or even unsworn document or answer to 
interrogatories shown in the record that is called for and 
required under 56(e) of the Rules, to re~ute material facts 
shown in the record in support of plaintiffs cause that 
. d 3 might preclude summary JU gment. 
To any suggestion appellant might make to the 
effect that the Bamberger interests have not laid any claim 
3. Rule 56(e), entitled "Form of Affidavits; Further 
Testimony; Defense Required," says: "Supporting and oppos-
ing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
the matters stated therein." 
-6-
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in the property involved here and claimed by the appellant, 
counsel for appellant have, in fairness, conceded that the 
abstract of title shows that in a Deed issued by the Trustee 
in the Estate of Eleanor F. Bamberger, he conveyed an un-
divided interest in "all" of the claims involved in the 
present suit, on July 25, 1962. Eleanor was the sole bene-
ficiary of whatever Ernest had in such claims. The convey-
ance was eighteen years before the present suit was filed, 
well in excess of the seven year adverse title requirements. 
It is significant that the record shows that all taxes were 
paid on the claims involved here, the claims were possessed 
since that time, and the operation of the Trustee's Deed 
obviously was a "hostile" act reflecting both an intention 
to adverse, and by its recordation, a notice to any party 
claiming an interest in the property, including the Schulders. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE 
WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT TO RESOLVE. 
Rule 56(e), that implements Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. 
1953, 4 sets forth the procedure to determine whether a Sum-
mary Judgment is appropriate and reads as follows: 
4. "(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall 
be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of 
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages." 
-7-
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"(e) Form of Affidavits; Further 
Testimony; Defense Required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, s0all set 
forth such facts as would be admissibl? 
in evidence, and shall s<1,•w ,J,ftirma,ti'i'"l'.-_ 
that the affiant is co~pet2nt to tPs~ fy 
to the matters stated i::1erel:l. Swurc1 or 
certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall 
be attached thereto or served therewith. 
The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary 
judgent is made and supported as provided 
in this Rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denia~~ 
of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this Rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him. 
The Answer filed by the appellant is not under oath, 
and even if it were it is simply a general denial, accom-
pa.nied by two "affirmative" unverified defenses saying that 
1) if the plaintiffs used the property "openly or notor-
iously" as alleged, it was with the defendants' consent, and 
that 2) if the plaintiffs paid the taxes as alleged, it was 
done "voluntarily." 
Where a prima facie case has been made out by the 
plaintiffs' pleadings and supporting affidavits, verified 
answers to interrogatories and the like, under Rule 56(e) as 
has been done here, a motion for Summary Judgment shall be 
granted, as was done here, and the Supreme Court will affirm, 
as demonstrated by its numerous precedents, some of which are 
called to its attention, such as: 
Thornock V. Cook, 5 where it was said throug~ 
5. 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). 
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Mr. Justice Stewart, that: 
"The defendant cannot rely on the 
mere allegations or denials of her 
pleadings to avoid a Summary Judgment, 
but must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial, 
Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P." 
This basic principle has been repeated and reaf-
firmed many times by this Court, by different language 
saying about the same thing. Perhaps the most frequently 
cited case is Dupler v. Yates, 6 which has the following to 
say: 
"When adequate proof is submitted in 
support of the motion, the pleadings are 
not sufficient to raise an issue of fact." 
Again, the Court said: 
"Upon motion for summary judgment, 
the courts ought to recognize, as a mini-
mum, that the opposing party produce some 
evidentiary matter in contradiction of 
the movant's case or specify in an affi-
davit the reason why he cannot do so." 
A more recent case, James v. Hinkle7 , authored by 
Mr. Justice Stewart, unanimously stated the purpose of Rule 
56(e) to be as follows: 
"Pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, when a motion for 
summary judgment is made, the affidavit 
of an adverse party must contain speci-
fic evidentiary facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial. Walker 
v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 
29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973); 
Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 
P.2d 1021 (1968). Defendants have 
failed to identify with specificity any 
material issue of fact, and plaintiff, as 
a matter of law, is entitled to conveyance 
of the title." 
6. 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 (1960). 
7. 611 P.2d 733 (1980). 
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In Walker v. Rocky Mtn. Rec. Corp., 8 which had to 
do with an affidavit in opposition to a ~otion for Summary 
Judgment, in holding that the defendan: did not preclude 
summary judgment because there remained a genuine issue of 
fact, the Utah Supreme Court took the position that no further 
findings were necessary because: 
"The opposing affidavit submitted by 
the defendant did not comport with the 
requirements of Rule 56(e), i.e., such 
affidavit must be made on personal knowl-
edge of the affiant." 
See also Western States v. Blomquist. 9 
In the instant case, the appellant Schulder filed 
no affidavit whatever, and his pleading simply was an unsworn 
general denial, and two conclusions that even were prefaced 
by "ifs." 
The interpretations of Rules 56(c) and (e) have 
been affirmed in many other cases, including Albrecht v. 
Uranium Services, 10 involving "abandonment" of mining claims. 
In a split decision, Mr. Justice 'vlaughan, author, and Mr. 
Justice Stewart differed, but only as to whether the "facts" 
did or did not present a genuine "issue," but not as to inter-
pretation of Rule 56, in which they agreed. See also Jensen 
v. 'vl.S.T.T. 11 
The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme 
Court, which requires counter-affidavits on Motion for Summary 
Judgment under Rule 56(e) is Clarkson v. Western Heritage, 
8. 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). 
9. 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 (1972). 
10. 596 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1979). 
11. 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980). 
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Utah, 627 P.2d 72 (1981), written by Judge Gould, District 
Judge, which re-affirms the decisions set out hereinabove, 
in the following language: 
"Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
was supported by affidavit, which recited 
facts sufficient to found jurisdiction 
in the State of Arizona. This affidavit 
was not countered by an opposing aff~­
davi t by defendants. Our Rule 56(e) 
clearly requires an opposing affidavit 
in order to create a genuine issue of 
material fact, and does not permit a 
party to rely upon his pleading to create 
a disputed fact issue. The trial court 
correctly took the facts set forth in the 
plaintiffs' affidavit to be true, and 
ruled accordingly. We find no error in 
the trial court's ruling on the summary 
judgment motion." [Emphasis supplied] 
The Appellant's First Point on appeal claims that 
his "Answer" and his "Memorandum" filed in this case raised 
genuine issues of fact. Neither pleading was verified, neither 
was supported by any affidavit, nor by anyone claiming to be 
competent to testify, as is required under Rule 56(e), -
and the Point, therefore, is of no avail whatever in forcing 
a trial of issues that the Rule says can be tried if, and 
only if, the defendant, one way or another submits 1) specific 
facts, 2) under oath in order to preclude the granting of a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Assuming, arguendo that he had offered statements 
under oath, which he clearly did not do, he says erroneously 
that his Answer and Memorandum would raise the following 
issues: 
a) "Possession of the Bambergers for the necessary 
seven years to adverse. This is not an issue here, since 
the Bambergers have had a right of possession by virtue of a 
-11-
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tenancy-in-common deed, dated in 1911, and their pleadings 
and affidavits reflect that recorded fact, as shown in the 
abstract of title. 
b) Whether Bambergers paid the taxes "voluntar-
ily," which may be answered by saying that, first, it makes 
no difference under the statute how the taxes are paid, and 
it would be an unusual case where one claiming by ''adverse 
possession" did not pay the taxes other than "voluntarily"; 
and 
c) Whether the taxes levied were paid according to 
law. This so-called "issue" also is not an issue here, since 
it obviously is born of appellant's error in examining the 
the record, since he relies on "non-payment of taxes for the 
years 1974 through 1977, saying in his Brief, pp. 8-9: 
"However, the taxes levied on the 
claims were not paid on such interests 
for the years 1974, 1975, 1976 and l977." 
He then claims they were "redeemed." An examina-
tion of the Record clearly shows that what appellant is talking 
about is the two-thirds interest of Clarks, the original 
patentees, and that with respect to the one-third interest 
conveyed by them to Bamberger and Schulder, the taxes have 
been paid on time and have never been delinquent, as shown 
in the record. (Ex. 8). 
From the above, any attack on the judgment based 
on error in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment, is 
withou~ any merit, since appellant, under the statutes and 
the cases construing them, not shown any effort by him or 
his predecessors to do anything in compliance with the 
statutes or the case law applicable to adverse possession 
-12-
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situations. 
Clearly, the lower Court's summary judgment should 
be affirmed, since the appellant has not complied with Rules 
56(c) and (e) in any manner. 
II 
THE FACTS SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT"S JUDGMENT. 
Although we contend the failure of appellant to 
comply in any way with Rules 56(c) and (e), is dispositive 
here without deciding Point II, we address that Point by 
briefly reviewing the facts and pertinent authorities to re-
fute appellant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence. 
As a preliminary matter, it is conceded that this 
is a proper case where one co-tenant may claim title by 
adverse possession; that to acquire such title, the claimant 
must have a) an intention to do so, b) a possession that is 
inconsistent with the co-tenant's interest (which the cases 
variously term as "open," "notorious," "adverse," "hostile" 
or the like, c) coupled with the co-tenant's knowledge 
thereof, or that which reasonably he should know by "notice" 
12 given by the adversing co-tenant, or by circumstances that 
reasonably would impart such notice to such co-tenant. 13 
Also, that "adverse possession" statutes are not 
only 1) limitation statutes, but 2) such as expressly are 
12. 82 A.L.R.2d 5. 
13. Elder v. McCluskey, 70 F. 529: "The adverse claimant 
need not give actual notice, but need only to 'bring it home 
to bis co-tenant by his conduct, the implication of which 
cannot escape the notice of the world about him, or of 
anyone, though not a resident of the neighborhood, who bas 
an interest in the property, and exercises that degree of 
attention in respect to what is his, that the law presumes 
in every owner.'" 
-13-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
based on "presumptions" such as Sec. 78-12-7, U.C.A., 1953, 
that indulges 1) a presumption of ownership in the record 
title holder and 2) that occupation by anyone else is sub-
ordinate thereto, unless occupied adversely by the latter 
for seven years, - with the necessary implication that the 
latter has at least one leg up on acquiring the former's 
title. Sec. 78-12-7.1 also expressly presumes ownership in 
a tax title claimant who shows possession for 4 years to the 
exclusion of the record owner. Such presumptions have 
statutory probative force such as do common law presumptions 
where guaranty of truthfulness is attributed to a number of 
reasons. Some have to do with "passage of time," a "lost" 
or "pre-sumed" grant, "continued payment of taxes," "quiet 
enjoyment for a long time," "failure of owners to assert 
rights for a long time," "notice of adverse user by filing 
suit," policy of "repose" in making certain title to prop-
perty, etc. All these would appear pertinent in this case, 
where continuity of treatment of the property began about 
seventy years ago in 1909 and has persisted even up to the 
time of judgment in this case. 
14 Clotworthy v. Clyde, a Utah case, adheres to the 
principle that conduct alone, by acts inconsistent with 
ownership in another, is tantamount to and presumably effec-
tive in establishing title by adverse possession. 
Irrespective of, but in addition to, and as a 
separate basis for satisfying the principle that one should 
have notice about any adverse use before divestiture of an 
14. 
716; 
265 P.2d 420; see also Smith v. Hamakua, 13 Hawaii 
Mounce v. Hargis, 278 S.W. 107. 
-14-
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interest, it is held that bringing an action to quiet title 
in and of itself constitutes notice sufficient to establish 
title, along with other facts, in one claiming by adverse 
use. Peper v. Trust Co. 15 
Other typical facts showing an adverse user and 
notice thereof by prescription is shown in Richins v. 
Struhs16 an adverse possession case involving a driveway, 
which said: 
"The origin and purpose of their 
recognition arises out of the general 
policy of the law of assuring the peace 
and good order of society by leaving a 
long establilshed status quo at rest 
rather than by disturbing it ••• 
Consequently it should be given effect 
to prevent the very thing which defend-
ants have attempted here: the upsetting 
of a situation which has existed ami-
cably since "the memory of man runneth 
not to the contrary." 
In Baber v. Baber, 94 S.E. 209 (Va. 1917) it was 
held that where a tenant had had possession of the property 
for 34 years, that notice "may be presumed from a great 
lapse of time, with other circumstances." 
In an old "leading" case stressing long-possession 
as being an important factor for a jury to consider in 
determining an effective adverse possession on the basis of 
a co-tenant's knowledge thereof sufficient to affirm a 
verdict to that effect, is Doe, ex Fishar v. Prasser, 98 
Eng. Reprint 1052 (1774), where possession for 36 years was 
claimed to be sufficient for an "ouster" on the basis of 
long possession reflecting co-tenants "notice" or "knowl-
edge," Lord Mansfield left it to the jury to say "whether 
15. 219 s.w. 942. 
16. 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314 (1966). 
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there was not sufficient evidence before them to presume an 
actual ouster," and the jury having so fo11nd, Loci '13.nsf ield 
then said "they were w:i.rranted by the length ': f ~ irr:.c> to 
presume an adverse possession by one of the ten:i.nts in 
common," - and the other circumstances of the case were t'1a. ': 
the adverse co-tenants never sought an accounting from the 
plaintiff co-tenant. This case, besides imposing a duty on 
the part of a disseised tenant to seek such an accounting 
from the co-tenant trying to disseise him, along with other 
cases, firmly establishes that the question of adverse pos-
session is a jury question based on a "reasonable ;nan" 
concept. 
The Bamberger interests having had the right of 
possession and paying the taxes continuously for at least 40 
years, and presumptively for 70 years from 1911, the date of 
the deed, certainly is evidence of notice of their claim to 
the Schulders, who have had an opportunity to learn of such 
adverse claim by such possession, payment of taxes, common 
knowledge of those in the neighborhood, preservation of the 
claim against double tax assessment by the County and filing 
of this lawsuit, after which, up to and including date of 
judgment, neither appellant nor Schulder's estate, nor any 
other Schulder has as much as offered to pay any pro rata 
taxes levied, or expenses incurred on the property. 
For some unknown reason, the appellant, in its 
Trial Memorandum" spent a good portion thereof in assarting 
that the respondents' "claim of adverse possession is not 
founded on a written instrument or judgment under color of 
-16-
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title" under Sec. 78-12-8, and discusses other statutes and 
authorities that in no way are germane to respondents' 
written instrument claim under Sec. 78-12-8. At the bottom 
of page 2 of the First Cause of Action, the complaint alleges 
ownership by virtue of a written quitclaim deed, in the 
April and Virginia claims which was incorporated in the 
Second Cause as being with ''color of title," and alleging an 
open and notorious possession as against "all persons, 
including the defendants." 
The above observations are made to eliminate doubt 
or confusion as to the nature of one of plaintiffs' claims. 
The appellant apparently has abandoned any argument on this 
point, since it is not repeated in his brief on appeal, nor 
is it assigned as a Point on Appeal. Hence, the only matters 
that need to be demonstrated on appeal to affirm the summary 
judgment, are those in satisfaction of the pertinent parts 
of Sec. 78-12-9, "What Constitutes Adverse Possession Under 
Written Instrument," which, eliminating parts unnecessary to 
prove in this case, reads as follows: 
"78-12-9. What constitutes adverse 
possession under written instrument. -
For the purpose of constituting an adverse 
possession by any person claiming a title 
founded upon a written instrument 5?.E. ~ 
judgment or decree, land is deemed to 
have been possessed and occupied in the 
following cases: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) Where, although not inclosed 
it has been used ••. for the ordi-
nary use of the occupant. 
-17-
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Sub-sections (1) and (2) need not be proved singly 
or in tandem to perfect title by adverse possession. Only 
Sub-section (3) needs satisfying. In Tol C:ec Ranch v. Babcoc'{, l: 
an unfenced mining claim case where an "adverse use" was 
held to have established title under Sec. 78-12-9, Sub-
section (3) "for the ordinary use of the occupant," there 
was only a small part of the adversed land occupied and used 
for storing vehicles over a 34 year continuous period, the 
Utah Court said: 
"The land was occupied and used the 
same as other lands were in the neighor=:-
hood. -The possession wasOpen, notor-
ious • • and under claim of right. 
It must, therefore, necessarily be deemed 
to have been adverse to the holder of the 
legal title, and such long-continued 
possession may be deemed to have been 
adverse, though not in character hostile. 
Where one is shown t()have been in 
possession as owner for the period of 
limitation, apparently 
such possession is not 
wise accounted for, it 
to have been adverse:" 
-----
as owner, and 
explained or other-
wi 11 be presumed 
In Cooper v. Carter, 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P.2d 320 
(1957) where the land was unfenced, and involved "color of 
title," a Title 78-12-12 adverse possession situation, "for 
the ordinary use of the occupant," with payment of taxes, 
the court, after saying the possession need be open and notor-
ious, said, however, that fencing the property was not 
dispositive, and that: 
it is common knowledge that in 
the unfenced grazing areas of our state 
entry or trespass is commonly done and is 
not regarded as of any serious impact. 
People often go on such lands for riding, 
17. 24 Utah 183, 66 P. 876 (1901). 
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hiking, hunting and other innocuous 
purposes • . without any objection from 
the owners." 
So saying, the court upheld an adverse possession 
claim of title, where a sheep man grazed his sheep, with 
exclusive possession, for only three weeks ~ year, for over 
seven years." 
Compare the facts in that case with the facts in 
the instant case. 
As to Schulder's knowledge of the adverse claim 
asserted by the Bamberger interests, it is significant that 
the appellant filed precisely nothing, sworn or not-sworn, 
specifically evidencing any absence of knowledge or "notice" 
of the latter's adverse claims. This failure to assert any 
claim at any time, under oath, or not under oath, should 
foreclose any claim of "genuine issue of fact" that has to 
be set out specifically under Rules 56(c) and (e). 
Under the authorities, it is almost inconceivable 
that the appellant and his predecessors had no "notice" of 
Ernest Bambergers mining activities in the area and his 
adverse claim. His co-grantee, a lawyer, during his life-
time, from 1911 to 1926 and for 15 years, at no time reg-
istered any interest in these claims, or made any claim of 
an interest in them or offered to share in taxes or expense 
that can be found in the record. Nor was any hint made in 
any affidavit, or other document as to any interest in the 
claims. Even the lawyer who was appointed administrator of 
Schulder's estate did not list any interest in the inventory 
and appraisement, nothing appears in the record to indicate 
-19-
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any such listing. On the contrary, the inventory that was 
filed specifically listed real properties by metes and 
bounds situate in Sevier County, Utah; Lots 28 and 29 in 
Block 7, Arlington Heights, in Salt Lake County; an undi-
vided interest in the Braffet Coal Land case pending in the 
U. S. Supreme Court; an undivided interest in the Davis Oil 
Shale lands;" and an undivided interest in the Milner-Carbon 
County Coal case pending in the same court. Since the 
filing of that inventory, the defendant here, Russell Gray-
don Schulder, son of the grantee, and his present adminis-
trator, has done nothing over the past 31 years, nor has 
Maude L. Schulder, wife of the decedent, nor bas Ann Schulder, 
daughter of the decedent, done anything whatever by way of 
payment of any assessed taxes, offering to pay any pro rata 
share of any taxes paid or expenses incurred by Bambergers, 
nor is there anything in the abstract of title, in the 
record, or by any other evidence that any of said heirs, or 
their decedent father, have ever been present on the claims 
or done anything at all to support any claim whatever hat 
they might have asserted in said claims other than is evi-
denced by a single document, the 68 year old deed mentioned 
hereinabove. Such failure is quite inconsistent with the 
established presumption that an owner will watch over and do 
what is necessary to protect his property. 
Our own Supreme Court in Godfrey v. Munson, 597 
P.2d 885, has considered the importance of such failure to 
list ~ssets in proving adverse possession in another. In 
Godfrey there was a family difference, where one side claimed 
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under a written instrument (deed) but nonetheless failed in 
establishing title against one having a history of long 
possession (67 years), where this Court assigned as a 
significant factor, the fact that "the property was not 
included in the estate of Eliza M. Pack Godfrey." 
Furthermore, since the complaint was filed, which 
in itself is "notice" of the adverse claim of plaintiffs, 
the defendant has had knowledge of the claim ever since 
has not offered to pay any share of taxes or expense, nor 
made any tender in court to cover any such share, nor offered 
a bond to secure payment of any such amounts. 
The authorities touchng the question of what kind 
of adverse possession is necessary to import notice to 
interested persons vary in definition, but they generally 
require that something be done that either gives actual or 
constructive notice that would put an erstwhile record owner 
on guard to protect his property against one who claims an 
adverse interest under the statute or the common law. 
Otherwise, the doctrine of "repose" can operate to accom-
plish a divestiture. 
Harking back to the adverse possession statutes 
involved in this case, the Courts have seen fit to interpret 
their provisions as to what kind of adverse possession is 
necessary to satisfy them. For example, 78-12-9, - where 
the adverse possession required is found in the subdivision: 
(1) "cultivation or improvement,"£.!:. (2) fencing,£.!:., (3) 
where "although uninclosed," by occupation "for the ordinary 
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use of the occupant." 
As to re<-iuire'"'.l•"nts unrl.er the statute, "open, 
notorious and adverse," generally are said by the cases to 
be adverbs that are synonymous, meaning the same, and not 
connoting "hostile" as a layman might conclude. On the 
contrary they may mean even "friendly, such as enunciated in 
Quincy v. Kratiz, 328 N.E.2d 699, where a family dispute 
arose as to entitlement of "':h<? property, - where one member 
claimed by adverse possession, the court said: 
"While we recognize that for posses-
sion to be hostile in its inception, no 
spirit of animosity or hostility is re= 
quired nor need the adverse claimant be 
guilty of deliberate or wilful tortious 
conduct, (Wijas v. Clorfene, 126 Ill.App. 
2d 315, 262, N.E.2d 830, it has been held 
that using and controlling the property 
as an owner is the ordinary way of assert-
ing title thereto." 
Richards v. Struhs, 17 Utah 2d 356, 412 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1966), adhered to such position, quoting another case 
that re-affirmed the concept with more emphasis by saying: 
"The elements of a title by limita-
tion are uninterrupted possession - actual, 
visible, notorious, adverse, and hostile, 
under color and claim of right for the 
statutory period. 'The words adverse and 
hostile mean practically the same thing.' 
And either of them can be omitted in de-
fining the character of the possession, 
provided the other is used." 
As to the Schulders' doing anything to show any 
claim to the property, Plaintiffs' affidavits tend to show 
that Russell G. Schulder and his successors were and are 
unknown in mining circles, as claimants of an interest in 
the property subject of this litigation. The owners of 
claims contiguous therewith, to-wit, the SilvPr Queen and 
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two Lilly claims, owned by United Park City Corp. before and 
after 1958 and at this time, have not been aware of anyone 
named Schulder claiming an interest in the April and Virginia 
claims, as reflected in Mr. Osika's affidavit. The record 
shows that these owners actually settled their boundary 
lines between their claims and the plaintiffs' claims, 
without concerning any claim of the Schulders, which re-
flects the common knowledge and understanding in the mining 
community that the Bamberger interests were the sole owners 
of the property. The same is reflected in a letter from one 
Huseth, addressed to W. H. Olwell, plaintiff herein, dated 
June 2, 1980, describing a sewer easement he sought to 
acquire. The letter and "location map" are in evidence, 
and were forwrded to Olwell, as representative of the Bam-
bergers as sole owners. Nothing was mentioned as to any 
joint interest with any other possible claimants or the 
Schulders. 
The same treatment by others in the mining industry, 
based on an assumption that no one but the Bambergers owned 
the claims, reflects a common understanding in the area that 
the Bambergers were sole owners, holding themselves out to 
the world, including Schulders as being the sole owners of 
the claims, lending considerable substance to the fact that 
Schulders must have had knowledge of Bambergers' adverse 
intention and claim or that a strong presumption exists that 
they did or should have had such knowledge. Such under-
standing in the neighborhood would justify a finding even of 
abandonment, which has been alleged here but not canvassed 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in length. (Noebuck v. Mecasta, 229 N.W.2d 343 (Mich); 
Jakober v. Loews, 265 A.2d 429). 
It would appear that somewhere along the line the 
Schulders, if they claimed any interest at all, reasonably 
should have known what the Bambergers' have been claiming, 
and what the understanding in the community has been, as 
reflected by contiguous owners who even settled their own 
boundaries on the assumption that the Bambeger people were 
sole owners. 
Besides, there is competent authority to the 
effect that an owner is bound to know about an adverse 
useage of his property. In Alaska Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 
1049 (Alaska), it was said that: 
"The owner need not actually know 
about the presence of an adverse possession; 
what a duly alert owner would have known, 
the owner is~ged withlmOwing,"° and 
where possession is otherwise proven, 
courts generally recognize that community 
repute as well as physical visibility 
is relevant evidence that the true owner 
has been put on notice.- -- --- ----
The affidavits of E. Lamar Oshika, Donald Dixon 
and William H. Olwell, all attest to the fact that the 
Schulders failed to exercise the required "diligence'' in 
protecting any claimed interest, over a 68 year period. They 
are attestations reflecting the Schulders' "knowledge" or 
reason to know of Bambergers' claim. 
Other representative cases of adverse user that would 
give notice or knowledge of a person's adverse claim, are: 
Adams v. Johnson, 136 N.W.2d 78, involving a family 
dispute based on color of title and adverse possession, the 
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court said that to overcome the presumption of the sort of 
"per tout et non per my" concept of co-tenancy, the court said 
what courts generally espouse, that: "An express notice is 
not necessary, an intention to hold the land adversely to 
the owners may be derived from all the circumstances of the 
case." In that case the court pointed out that two brothers' 
possession was actual, open and notorious, farming as owners 
for 50 years, payng the taxes, and that "the surrounding 
neighbors and acquaintances considered them to be the sole 
owners" and went even so far as to say "we do not think that 
ignorance of ownership by a co-tenant out of possession is 
necessarily conclusive against a finding of adverse posses-
sion by a co-tenant in possession." Clotworthy v. Clyde, 
supra, also subscribes to the principle that actual notice 
of the claim of adverse possession may be unnecessary. 
The very recent case of Alaska v. Linck, 589 P.2d 
1049 (1977) where both the parties claimed under written 
instruments, or "color of title" was determined on Motion 
For Summary Judgment, as here, based on affidavits anent 
adverse possession, as filed here. The determination of 
ownership was arrived at under the provisions of a ~ 
year statute idential to ours. That case considers most 
of the dispositive features of this case, and its language and 
citation of authority are supportive of the contentions of 
plaintiffs here, some of which we respectfully present for 
consideration by the Court. 
1. It says, as to the requirement that adverse 
possession need be "continuous and uninterrupted," that: 
-25-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"This does not necessarily mean that the possessor mu,.; t '.'""-
side on or be physically present at the property (~. v. G., 
322 P.2d 789, 3 Am.Jur.2d, Adv. Poss., Secs. 50, 5GJ. 
2. That "The nature of possession to meet this 
requirement depends on the character of the property. Gne 
test is whether the adverse possessor has used the land as 
'an average owner of similar property would use it.'" (F. 
v. E., 436 P.2d 582; Cooper v. Carter, 7 Utah 2d 9). 
3. That "Any one of the acts • standi:iu, alone 
might be insufficient, but in combination deLlonstrate contin-
uous and uninterrupted possession. 
4. "Other courts have found similar acti_vi ty suffi-
cient for adverse possession of forested land in rural areas." 
(24 A.L.R.2d 632). 
5. As to "notorious" possession: "The owner need 
not know about the presence of an adverse possession; - what 
a duly alert owner would have known, the owner is charged 
with knowing.'" (C v K. 237 P.2d 1053 (Ida. 1951). 
6. We cannot expect the possessor of uninhabited 
and forested land to do what the possessor of urban resi-
dential land would do before we charge the record owner with 
notice. 
Statutes having to do with acquisition of rights 
by adverse possession, like those dealing with prescrip-
tive rights under the comraon law right based on possession 
of another's land for more than 20 years, are ordinarily 
referred to as statutes of "repose." It is suggested that the 
instant case can be affirmed on any "time frame" basis, since 
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the Bambergers have had possession for 70 years. It is further 
urged that the complimentary requirements found in the Utah 
7-year statute, have been satisfied as to "payment of taxes" 
and "use," - particularly "for the ordinary use of the 
occupant under Sec. 78-12-9(3). Such principle of laying 
titles to rest has been employed progressively more and more, 
and with greater liberality. The Utah Court has so embraced 
it on a number of occasions, reflected by the following 
cases: 
In Dye v. Miller & Viele, 587 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978) 
the Utah Supreme Court adopted such principle by expressly 
affirming Peterson v. Callister, 2 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814 
(Utah 1955) and Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 884 
(Utah 1953), which applied it. Others are Cope v. Bountiful 
Livestock, 13 Utah 2d 20, 368 P.2d 68 (Utah 1962); and Fal-
conaero v. Bowers , 16 Utah 2d 202, 398 P.2d 206 (Utah). 
The principle aptly is stated in the opinion of a 
sister state, - Alaska v. Linck, supra, which says: 
"The trial court's decision furthers 
the public policies underlying the law 
of adverse possession. While, like 
other statutes keep stale cases out of 
the courts, they serve other important 
public policies as well. They exist 
because of a belief "that title to land 
should no't long be in doubt, that society 
will benefit from someone's making use of 
land the owner leaves idle, and that 
third persons who come to regard the 
occupant as owner may be protected." 
The defendant cites only one case that even re-
motely could be germane here, - Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 
P.2d 520 (Utah 1978). Clearly, however, it has no disposi-
tive force. No Motion for Summary Judgment was involved. 
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There was a plenary trial, resulting in disputed facts, one 
of which was that one of the two contesting, joint tenancy 
brothers, conceded that they talked about selling their 
property after the one had operated the farm for 10 years 
unprofitably, and had left, and which then was farmed by the 
other, who, after seven years, attempted to convey full 
title to a third party. There were few, if any facts, 
similar to those in the instant case. It is simply an 
adverse possession case where the trial court believed the 
first brother's evidence as opposed to the other's, which the 
Utah Supreme Court also chose to believe, by affirming the 
judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED FOR THE FOLLOWING 
REASONS: 
1. The defendants' Answer is an unsupported, un-
verified pleading which cannot preclude the granting of a 
Summary Judgment under Rule 56(c) and (e). This alone 
should decide this case. 
2. It is undisputed that Ernest Bamberger and his 
successors have satisfied "payment of taxes" requirements, 
evidenced by the record and stipulation of the defendant. 
3. It is undisputed that they have had actual, 
constructive and continuous possession of the claims, as 
shown in the abstract, document of title and otherwise. 
4. Schulders have made no claim to possession 
other than through the original 1911 deed. 
5. No one ever has offered to reimburse Bamberger 
or his successors for taxes and other expenses. 
6. The Record shows that Schulders knew or reason-
ably should have known of Bambergers' adverse claim of 
ownership. 
7. People acquainted with the area and claims 
understood the claims were owned solely by the Bamberger 
interests; and that they had not known of any claim being 
registered by Schulders in the unfenced, forested property 
claimed by Bambergers. 
8. That neighbors even settled contiguous bound-
aries on the assumption that the Bambergers were sole owners. 
9, That they treated the claims as unfenced, 
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forested mining claims, ~s they own, without necessity of 
cultivation or fencing. 
10. That Sec. 78-12-9(3) allows for title by 
adverse possession, if the property is used for one of four 
reasons, i.e., "for the ordinary use of the occupant;" that 
in which Bamberger was well known, - mining. 
11. That Bambergers protect~d the property by 
possession, payment of taxes, and actively keeping the title 
straightened out with the County officials. 
12. That the claims were never listed in Schulder's 
probate; but were in Bamberger's. 
13. That even after this suit was filed, and for 
18 months, defendant or no one else, personally or as 
representative, offered or tendered into Court, any reim-
bursement for taxes or expenses incurred against the prop-
erty, nor for a period of at least 68 years. 
14. That defendant's cited authorities are not 
pertinent under the facts developed by plaintiffs in the 
pleading and procedural process requirements. 
15. The defendant erred in Point II of his Brief 
when he claimed respondents had not paid the taxes within 
the 7-year statutory period. The record reflects that the 
taxes were paid, and he was talking about different prop-
erty. 
16. The only authority cited by appellant clearly 
is not germane. There was no Motion for Summary Judgment 
involved, a trial was had on disputed testimony and the 
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trial court believed to be against a finding of adverse 
possession. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
c~H·~ 
10 So. Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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84101, on this day of June, 1981. 
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